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Abstract 
This paper combines several important arguments, which have puzzled economic theory for 
decades, to arrive at a more adequate description of the current global crisis. The main 
theoretical innovation is to view the long-run economic evolution as a stepwise evolution of 
money forms. Moreover, as already indicated in the title, this development of money forms 
is closely linked to the development of social institutions, in particular of state institutions. 
Capital, the most recent form of money, today has to be understood as an omnipresent 
algorithm, as a growth imperative implicit in social institutions and internalized models. The 
task of evolutionary political economy thus will be to provide an adequate theoretical 
counterpart to mirror these processes. This paper explores how far a careful reconsideration 
of received economic theory can contribute to this task.   
 
Money 
All human societies with a developed political economy are monetary economies. The very 
existence of interplay of production and consumption activities of a society’s members 
implies that periodically reappearing habits, of relations between activities become visible 
and are memorized. At a certain point of development the repetitions – using days and years 
as time units – are externalized as signs on physical carriers. Written language starts to serve 
as a special device to adjust and to regulate activities according to processes going on in the 
natural environment of society. The immediate importance of the new device is evident: 
advantageous behavior can be transmitted across generations without relying on 
interpersonally used spoken language only. Sign systems on physical carrier systems thus 
acquire an important social role, a metaphysical (i.e. more than physical) status, which 
stabilizes social evolution2. 
                                                          
1
 This paper is an updated version of an invited paper at the annual meeting of the “Ausschuss für 
evolutorische Ökonomik” of the “Verein für Socialpolitik” in Jena (Germany), July 2009. 
2
 There is, of course, an extensive body of literature discussing the historical and logical roots of sign systems 
like money. In particular European social scientists representing the academic turn of the New Left in the 
In economic theory the three basic functions of money usually mentioned in standard 
macroeconomics - ‘store of value’, ‘unit of accounting’, and ‘medium of exchange’– all refer 
to this specific role3. As for growing societies production is split up in time and space, so are 
its services and products. To bridge different time and different space a memory of the 
performed activity is materialized as a sign on a physical carrier. This unity of physical matter 
and its relation to the members of society stores what is called ‘social value’; its more 
mundane name is ‘money’. Since contributions to social evolution are so different in kind – 
and even more so the more developed and complicated the society becomes – intra-social 
organization calls for the measurement of relative social value4. Again the sign system of 
money can help by adding a scalar size, the units of social value accounting, to the material 
carrier. If these two prerequisites are given,  
(1) The commitment of the members of society to accept a system of social value 
relations expressed on a physical carrier system.  
(2) The acceptance of its specific quantitative expression as a set of certain relative 
money amounts.    
then exchange of social value via money as the medium of exchange is possible. The 
existence of money thus coincides with the existence of social organization already at a very 
early and primitive level. 
But even at this lowest level several implicit features of a monetary economy become 
visible, features usually not explicitly articulated in standard economic theory. Acceptance of 
a certain money system can be either voluntary or forced upon the members of society – or 
something in between. In any case acceptance thus reflects the power relations within a 
society5. If power is concentrated in the hands of a small group of members of society it is 
evident that the portrait of the leader of this small group on the coins used in this society 
should keep authority of the powerful alive. In more democratically organized systems with 
power only temporarily transferred to institutions, and recurrently checked by feedback 
mechanisms involving all members of society, in all these cases the monetary system carries 
the marks of the specific institutional setting prevailing in that society. The borders between 
voluntary and forced participation in the prevailing monetary system increasingly get blurred 
if one considers the next long-run trend. 
In ancient Greece the hegemony of Athena’s coin, the famous silver owl, needed the rich 
silver mines close to the city as well as the mighty fleet of Athens, the threat of punishment 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
aftermath of the youth revolt of the late sixties rediscovered this topic, e.g. [Müller, 1977], [Thomson, 1972], 
[De Brunhoff S., 1973].    
3
 Compare [Mankiw, 2010, chapter 4]. 
4
 This interwoven character of the social value system and the institutional framework of social institutions is 
also reflected in in modern mainstream economics, see [Walsh, 2010], or [Mishkin & Eakins, 2011]. 
5
 Some authors have emphasized the strong connections between the power structure implicit in money 
relations, and those existing in other social domains, e.g. symbolically amplified cultural hierarchy or gender 
hierarchy. In some cases it is even suggested that the former is determined by the latter, compare [Heinsohn 
G., 1984]. 
in case of disobedience was very visible. This obvious backup for the power of Athena’s 
monetary system gave it a very concrete character, a metallic taste. Since then money 
experienced a process of ever increasing abstraction. With the establishment of more 
sophisticated exertion of power, banknotes could free the availability of the monetary 
carrier medium from the pressures of production of precious metal. Abstraction thus proved 
the primacy of the social sources of money’s force as compared to the inherent social value 
of the carrier medium. The social sources of voluntary subordination under a monetary 
system became manifold and more binding as the next best alternative – voluntary 
disobedience – was losing ground quickly when the growth of monetary economies took 
off6. Nowadays money is just a rapid change of patterns on a computer screen, the mission 
of the abstraction process starting with the original problem has been completed. The 
overwhelming majority of human individuals has no choice but to voluntarily join monetary 
rules; on the way the content of the concept ‘voluntary’ has lost its meaning. 
Nevertheless - and despite the highly complicated setting of institutions and democratic 
feedback loops7 – contemporary money still is a sign system, which refers to abstract social 
value. For a single individual, one out of 7 billion humans worldwide, the evaluation of 
relative social value of all the activities and products with which it is concerned, certainly 
cannot be derived by insight in this complicated, global production structure. This difficulty, 
the deficiency not to grasp the complexity of the global production, lies at the root of 
subjective value theory, of microeconomic theory as it is taught since Walras, Menger and 
Jevons, since 1874. This theory thus is not just an ideological vehicle to fight the 
macroeconomic exploitation theories of the intellectuals flirting with the labor movement of 
the 19th century. Subjective value theory addresses a real problem of households: How to 
order purchases if a given amount of monetary income can be spent – the starting point for 
axiomatic utility theory8. But as this set of decisions falls apart from an understanding of 
production and reproduction of the overall political economy, the human individual is 
separated into an economic, utility maximizing entity and a political entity engaging in the 
multi-layered processes of more or less democratic feedback control. Production units, the 
other micro-unit covered by microeconomics, is the archetype of the decision-making entity 
put in the center of analysis. It is their (hypothesized) stylized decision problem, which is 
grafted on household behavior to describe it as utility maximization, the analogue to profit 
maximization. Again entrepreneurs are schizophrenic: On the one hand there is the input 
cost minimizing (and in the sequel profit maximizing) entity that is completely ignorant to 
the political evolution of its environment, and on the other hand there is the legal institution 
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 See [Davies, 2002] as reference for a detailed history of this process.  
7
 In a democracy the institutional setting is repeatedly restructured by a system of second-order institutional 
processes (including electoral processes) designed to enable entry and exit of first-order institutions. This, of 
course, implies that a dangerously smooth transition to non-democratic governance can occur.     
8
 A faint memory of the link to the overall social process can be seen in J.M. Keynes emphasis on the concept of 
effective demand. In denouncing needs, which cannot be translated in money terms, as less important he 
intuitively subscribes to classical political economy.  
with special status in the law system and vested interest political evolution9. For both 
microeconomic types of agent money (i.e. social value) is the exogenous constraint, which 
makes needs and profit possibilities appear scarce. The arrangement of social activities and 
their guiding institutions seems to be out of range of the microeconomic discourse, but if 
money is interpreted as a first form of a regulating device shaping the evolution of the 
former then the old tenets of classical political economy appear on the theoretical horizon 
again. The sign system of money still refers to the arrangement of human activities, to the 
setup of time spent at an enormous variety of occupations worldwide. To see how a crisis of 
social evolution is translated into, and amplified by a crisis of money forms the renaissance 
of political economy in the form of Keynesian macroeconomics has to be briefly reviewed. 
I will leave this argument on the role of money at this point, and take it up as a loose end in 
the last chapter.    
 
Credit 
At first glance, credit seems to be just another face of money: Accepting a coin instead of a 
certain amount of a commodity – usually in exchanges at markets – can be understood as 
giving credit, to literally believe (credo) in the validity of a sign on a carrier medium. The 
point, of course, is that it is not the partner in the exchange transaction to whom this 
believing refers. It rather is belief in the enduring trustworthiness of the social system which 
provides the environment for the exchange act. Money interpreted as credit enlarges its 
original function of bridging space and time for a species which has developed a common 
consciousness of mutual commitment. When towards the end of the Middle Ages merchants 
in Venice received credit from the wealthy local banks this credit always came in the form of 
money. But not all the money can be considered to be credit in the more narrow sense 
introduced by these early global merchants and explorers. 
To some extent the distinction is merely based on the temporal scale that is relevant. The 
coin in the pocket is only short-run property, easily exchanged at the next opportunity, 
whereas the money taken as credit by the above mentioned merchant was used up during a 
journey which often took years. But this notion of difference in physical time just is the 
appearance of a more substantial difference, which is based on the emergence of an 
economic time scale. The coin in the pocket remains inactive; its sole function is to preserve 
a certain amount of social value by freezing it as a sign on a piece of metal. The money given 
as credit to the merchant not only remains property for a longer physical time span, during 
the journey it indeed changes its form as well as its social value. By the actions of the 
merchant, a new social archetype, money as credit becomes a process. And this process, due 
to the ongoing change of money and commodity forms representing different systems of 
social value in different countries, produces its own type of time: economic time. Economic 
                                                          
9
 The classics saw this dichotomy very clearly and dubbed it the double existence of the citoyen (the politically 
emancipated member of society) and the bourgeois (the owner of a factory engaged in profit maximization).  
time runs parallel but not synchronous to physical time10. Consider two journeys of 
merchants, the first taking three years of physical time, the second taking six years. Assume 
that at the end of the first journey, when the merchant comes back to Venice and sells all 
the commodities he has brought that he owns an amount of money, which is five times as 
high as the one with which he started. Assume further that after the second journey the 
analogue amount of money owned by the merchant is ten times the original credit. In that 
case the speed of economic time of the two journeys would be equal since the (fictitious) 
growth rate of credit-money per physical time unit is the same. It is the growth rate of the 
amount of credit-money, which serves as measure the economic activity; if it falls to zero, 
then credit-money collapses and remains just money11. 
While this view of credit emphasizes its role in stimulating economic activity of merchants it 
nevertheless is linked to a specific perspective on its relation to savings. For the classical 
political economists the progressive role of those who use credit-money to transform it into 
economic activity was evident. Consumption was basically understood as the consumption 
of the feudal class, and the heroes of the new economic era were economic agents, which – 
contrary to the consuming feudal parasites – transformed money into economic growth12. 
Credit for the purpose of consumption was thus of no economic significance; if rich 
merchant families provided money for ‘Il Principe’, then no economic growth process was 
expected13. On the other hand the working class was considered to be involved in the 
process of accumulation only as a passive element, using money as medium of exchange for 
immediate physical reproduction, and never as credit-money. Credit for consumption thus 
was thought to be insignificant to explain the essence of credit-money. Savings of non-feudal 
households played either the same role as inventories for production units: a tool to 
smoothen the stream of income. Or, if they became more systematically growing as in the 
rich city-states of northern Italy, they were collected in banks financing merchants. This 
latter process thus clearly represents emergence of a new division of labor within the class 
of non-feudal rich families14: one group provides credit-money while the other one uses it 
for exploration and trade. Note that this emergence needed at least two elements, (i) a 
                                                          
10
 Economic time did exist before the emergence of credit; but it remained invisible since it was hiding behind 
the rhythm dictated by the seasons, which was synchronous to the major field of economic activity: agriculture.  
The treatment of the concept of time in political economy is remarkably underdeveloped, which mainly seems 
to be due to a somewhat blind adoption of the formal apparatus of the natural sciences. Indeed some insights 
from sociology, e.g. [Elias, 1993], still wait for to be appropriately appreciated in political economy.     
11
 In modern economic jargon this is often expressed as ‚money being a security with an interest rate of zero’. 
Evidently the determination of the set of securities bearing an interest rate of zero is further complicated if 
inflation rates (and the different possibilities to calculate them) are taken into account.   
12
 From Adam Smith’s arguments for the source of wealth to Keynes revival of the idea of the ‘euthanasia of 
the rentier’ progress was identified as the advance from feudal (over-)consumption to productivity-increasing 
re-investment of entrepreneurs. This common anti-feudal trait, of course, is in stark contrast to the basic 
differences of the worldview of these two godfathers of modern economic thought; compare [Foley, 2006]. 
13
 What actually was expected from the feudal sovereign was a guarantee for political stability, compare 
[Machiavelli, 1988 (1532)].   
14
 At this point the concept of a social class enters the argument. It turned out (and still turns out) to be of 
central importance for an analysis of capitalism. Despite the renaissance of meso-economics challenging the 
bipolar world of micro- and macroeconomics, (global) class analysis still has not reached the theoretical status 
it should have; compare [Wright, 2005] .  
certain vacuum within feudal power structures and (ii) a certain level of money hoardings15. 
It might well be that there is a more general - and acute – lesson to be learned for 
emergence of institutions in the current situation.  
Only when the labor movement gained significance towards the end of the 19th century 
savings of worker households started to play a macroeconomic role. Again the concurrent 
ideological turn to microeconomic reasoning prevented mainstream economic theory to 
recognize the importance of this development16. It needed the Great Depression and in the 
sequel Keynes, Schumpeter and their followers to reshape classical political economic theory 
to grasp some of the elements of the new era. Keynes rediscovered the importance of 
circular macroeconomic money flows, while Schumpeter - drawing to a considerable extent 
on Marx’ ideas – highlighted and sharpened the implications of the historical mission of 
entrepreneurs and innovation17. But when that happened, the form of credit-money had 
already developed into a new dominating process, into capital. Credit-money as money for 
consumption thus only appears when the next metamorphosis of money forms has taken 
place. 
Return now to the original add-on, which makes credit-money a historical and logical bridge 
between money and capital. While the existence of money is just a reflection of the 
generally recognized unity of a prevailing social setting the emergence of credit-money is a 
partial negation of money’s universality: With the credit given by a specific member of 
society to a specific other member the concerned money amount is not simply secured by 
the states monetary authority. It is additionally secured by a private contract between the 
two agents involved, a contract, which itself is correctly called a security. Note that with this 
new development of a specific kind of credit-money there does emerge the concept of 
private economic agents – as opposed to the physical individuals inhabiting the world of 
simple commodity producing societies18. Note further that the use of contracts implies the 
emergence of a corresponding specific law system19, which in turn is built up by a host of 
emerging institutions. These institutions become necessary to assure that the procedures 
agreed upon by the involved parties in advance (as content of the contract) are actually 
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 The first globally hegemonic country of merchant capitalism, the Netherlands, is another good example for 
the importance of these preconditions.  
16
 In this context the work of Veblen - certainly a maverick economist in his time – is remarkable, since he 
directed attention to consumption behavior of the non-workers, the ‘leisure class’ (see [Veblen, 1899]). 
Deriving class membership from the ‘conspicuous consumption’ habits of persons rather than from their roles 
in the production process he implicitly observes that to get credit for consumption purposes is a defining 
characteristic of the leisure class.  
17
 See [Catephores, 1994] for a more detailed explanation of this view. 
18
 It is remarkable how mainstream microeconomics from 1870 onwards (starting with [Walras L., 1874], 
[Jevons S., 1871], and [Menger C., 1871]) systematically confuses private economic agents and biological 
individuals. The major reason for that deficiency is the complete neglect of the evolution of money forms.  
19
 Laws thus are man-made and not innate economic properties of human individuals. Note the sharp contrast 
of this perspective of explaining the emergence and evolution of laws rather than discovering them. Even the 
approach of experimental economics falls prey to this misconception of microeconomic ideology when it simply 
tries to discover innate economic laws differing from the ones stipulated by neoclassical doctrine, e.g. altruism.   
executed as economic time proceeds; i.e. that commitment in the credit market becomes 
feasible. 
Evolution of new institutions for new private economic agents evidently coincides with the 
use of credit-money – and this, of course, challenges the intellectual commentators of the 
time anticipating a clash with the already existing political institutions of feudalism. When 
Montesquieu designed his famous idea of a division of power within the modern state, he 
does so, on the basis of a careful comparison of empirically observed systems in different 
times and countries [Montesquieu, 1748]. Credit-money as a bridge to capital, i.e. the next 
form of money, also paves the way to an understanding of the form of political organization 
accompanying capital: the nation state. This newly emerging political organization freed 
itself successively from its feudal bonds to provide an adequate structure of power relations 
for capitalism. It did so by monopolizing coercive power and institutionalizing the links 
between private economic agents. Again this argument will be taken up in the concluding 
chapter.    
Finally, one side-effect of the credit mechanism used by merchants has to be highlighted, 
since it unconsciously prepared the next step of social evolution: With their successful 
trading activities merchants were indeed starting to increase global, average labor 
productivity. By buying, transporting and selling commodities (and sometimes slaves) to 
increase their working credit-money some pre-existing specialization in the different parts of 
the world they explored20 entered global consumption, opened up new utility dimensions21 
or reduced average necessary labor inputs. Of course, such global effects were not 
recognized by the merchants themselves, and were additionally obscured by the fact that 
most advances were absorbed by the still powerful feudal elite. Nevertheless, ex post an 
increase in global technological abilities as well as a widening of consumption spaces due to 
merchants (credit financed) activities is evident. With the next step of monetary evolution 
this aspect of accommodating technological evolution proved to be one of the dominant 
elements of social progress. 
 
Capital 
If money not only is used as credit but assumes the form of a generally applicable program 
of accumulation, then it is called capital. Capital has all the features of credit-money but 
additionally in the form of a mandatory algorithm subordinates all strata of social 
organization. Credit-capital had explored and conquered society’s environment, capital also 
turns inside the more and more global society and its program takes hold of all humans and 
institutions to transform them into economic agents, into drivers of its abstract algorithm. 
Still the appearance of the money involved in this process has not changed all of the 
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 Compare for example the vivid description of global trade triangles in [Frank, 1978].  
21
 The change in the dimension of the utility space – some new commodities enter, others vanish – is one of the 
most important blind spots of mainstream economics, which evolutionary economics promises to shed light on. 
properties related to the lower forms (general acceptance, importance of contracts and 
private economic agents, etc.), which still apply. There just is the metamorphosis into a 
general principle guiding the carrier systems instead of being guided by the latter22. 
The program of the capital process in its most general form is rather simple and consists of 
the following commands:Capital Algorithm 
For each member of the set of currently possible visions do (‘vision loop’) 
Produce a vision of specific entrepreneurial activity 
Check expected wage cost 
Check expected interest on credit-money (vulgo ‘capital cost’) 
Check expected effective demand 
Compute expected growth rate of capital 
Estimate the probability to achieve that growth rate 
End of vision loop 
Choose the vision yielding the highest utility of a mean-variance utility function 
Check if the selected vision’s utility exceeds the expected utility of a supplier of credit-money  
If the lender’s utility is higher, then perform the chosen project, 
      else become a supplier of credit-money. 
  
 This innocent algorithmic prescription generalizes what merchants and their bankers 
already did with credit-money at the end of the 13th century23. But what makes the 
difference is the fact that in the course of the historic development of capitalism from 
merchant capitalism to industrial capitalism24 the abstract form of this algorithm proved to 
be universally applicable to all kinds of activities of economic agents. A look around in 
contemporary OECD countries reveals: There is almost no aspect of life that is not 
permeated by the workings of the capitalist program25. In a sense, the monetary core of the 
activities of certain groups in early merchant capitalism26 has turned from outside trade to 
all types of inside activity of private economic agents. In the end – in [Hanappi, 1989] this 
stage is called ‘integrated capitalism’ – not only production units but every household, and 
every institution has become a private economic agent following the abstract algorithm of 
capital accumulation. Concepts like human capital and competence capital show that the 
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 Karl Marx had anticipated this, and chose ‘Das Kapital’ and not ‘Die Kapitalisten’ as title for his opus magnus. 
In the second preface to this book he explains that the notion of ‘capitalist’ is to be understood as an abstract 
algorithm (a ‘Charaktermaske’), and not as an immediate reference to physical individuals [Marx, 1857].   
23
 Venice and Genoa had started to mint their own coins to support their conquest of world trade (compare 
[Braudel, 1986, pp.111-116]). The less abstract forms of money are thus not simply substituted by a new form, 
they are only adjusted to accommodate the new hegemonic form of money. This could also be a lesson to be 
learned for the current crisis.   
24
 For a detailed discussion of the stages of capitalism compare [Hanappi, 1989]. 
25
 The somewhat forgotten German social scientist Alfred Sohn-Rethel introduced an interesting hypothesis: 
Even the logical structure of humans’ mental models is framed by the evolution of commodity producing 
societies [Sohn-Rethel, 1978, pp. 103-133].  
26
 Distinction by function separates bankers from merchants, distinction by location (following [Braudel, 1986]) 
separates Brügge, Hanse cities, Northern Italian cities, the Champagne, Antwerpen – and later Amsterdam.  
higher degree of abstraction that money did arise to, enables and opens up an incredibly 
wide field of possible application. It is thus not surprising that in the history of economic 
thought a sharp turnaround took place: the mirror image of the real course of economic 
development observed in its contemporary state started to be taken as its actual origin. 
Transplanted into physical human individuals, from Robinson Crusoe to the more abstract 
homo oeconomicus, the private economic agent was considered to be the atom of ‘social 
physics’27.  From that perspective the true state of nature had been obscured in the past and 
only in full-fledged capitalism the true and final character of social relations reveals itself.  
There has been an economic history but once this final state is reached, history has ended – 
only some safeguarding to prevent external disturbances (modern economics calls them 
‘shocks’) is needed. 
It is interesting to see that with such a radical conceptual turn – mistaking a frozen mirror 
image as a parable of origin - not only evolutionary political economy becomes impossible; 
also money in its highest form of abstraction vanishes since it becomes an innate feature of 
private economic agents. The current indecisiveness of mainstream economic advisers 
drastically shows the impasse, which has been taken already a long time ago. 
But the methodological turn of economic theory towards the crude atomistic perspective 
had several other severe consequences too. Since the formalism adopted originally was a 
description of energy transformations of non-living, smallest elements of matter28, any 
description including the build-up of structures and clusters is simply impossible! The final 
issue emerging from that formalism in the natural sciences is the second law of 
thermodynamics, which states that in the long-run the stochastic trend towards an increase 
in entropy will prevail, i.e. a certain equilibrium state of (computable) maximum entropy will 
be approximated. The re-interpretation in microeconomic terms postulates this process as 
the working of market forces relating the owners of (‘scarce’) resources and in the long-run 
leading to a vector of relative prices – the correlate of maximum entropy in general 
equilibrium theory.  Note that ‘prices’ in this context are exchange relations of quantities of 
commodities29 and not a monetary expression of the social value of a unit of a certain 
commodity. To bridge – or, more ideologically interpreted: to disguise – this strange role of 
prices the theory had to be complemented by the adoption of the so-called quantity theory 
of money. If maximum entropy is reached, vulgo ‘in general equilibrium’, the vector of 
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 This expression was used by Auguste Comte to make clear that his vision of a future social science follows the 
example of the natural sciences [Comte, 1979 (1844)]. 
28
 Compare [Smith E. & Foley D., 2002] for a detailed treatment of that isomorphism. 
29
 It is surprising to see how in 1871 one of the founding fathers of GET, Stanley Jevons, already spelled out its 
methodological break: “I have attempted to treat Economy as a calculus of pleasure and pain, and have 
sketched out, almost irrespective of previous opinions, the form which the science, as it seems to me, must 
ultimately take. I have long thought that as it deals throughout with quantities, it must be a mathematical 
science in matter if not in language. … The Theory of Economy thus treated presents a close analogy to the 
science of Statistical Mechanics, and the Laws of Exchange are found to resemble the Laws of Equilibrium of a 
lever as determined by the principle of virtual velocities. The nature of Wealth and Value is explained by the 
consideration of indefinitely small amounts of pleasure and pain, just as the Theory of Statics is made to rest 
upon the equality of indefinitely small amounts of energy.” [Jevons, 1871, p. viii]. Pleasure and pain are inborn 
features of a material smallest entity, just like properties of atoms in physics.   
relative exchange quantities can be translated in a vector of money prices by simply 
assuming proportionality to the amount of money signs (on carrier systems) in circulation as 
well as to an exogenously assumed speed of circulation. Evidently the money form used in 
the quantity theory of money is not credit-money or capital. In the pure form of general 
equilibrium theory (GET) there is thus no endogenously developed theory of money, money 
and prices are just like a veil thrown by a monetary authority over true and ‘natural’ 
exchange ratios. 
A further dramatic consequence follows: If there is no theory of credit and capital, if the 
theory of social values is dissolved into predetermined preferences of a set of biological 
atoms moving towards its natural equilibrium via markets – then there is no room for an 
understanding of the growth of structure, of exactly those processes which constitute the 
emergence of life forms (of all evolutionary forms) living as temporary contradictions to the 
law of entropy30. The neglect of the evolution of money forms therefore is just the tip of the 
iceberg of the methodological sins of the atomistic turn. Growth, the central concept around 
which all types of biological theories are built, is explicitly excluded by assumption. 
And as a final, but pivotal, side-effect growth in life forms tends to produce species and at 
the same time the exploitative relations linking these species31. While the rate of growth of 
one species might be advanced by slowing down growth of the exploited species, feedback 
enhancing the growth of both eventually is possible. In other words, exploitation is a 
dynamic concept measurable over well-defined historic time spans32. Recaptured from this 
perspective the most advanced form of money, the universally applicable algorithm of 
capital, is just the abstract claim of social value to grow. The ways that such a growth of 
social value can take are not limited to the development of new forms of exploitation across 
and within species33.  To explore in which sense omnipresent capital processes can be 
superseded, which features might survive and which elements will have to be replaced 
rather rapidly goes a bit beyond the scope of this paper - though the concluding chapter will 
come back on this issue. 
With all these deficiencies the new microeconomic view at the turn of the century – though 
an apt ideological vehicle to attract a considerable part of the intellectual elite - was unable 
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 While the Second Law certainly has the aspiration of an eternal truth, the stochastic character of that truth 
implies that temporary counter-movements can occur. This in turn implies that such a build-up of neg-entropy 
has a beginning and an end - carriers of life necessarily are born at a point in time and die after a finite amount 
of physical time.  
31
 As with the simultaneous emergence of bankers and merchants on the one hand, and their relationship 
(credit-money) on the other hand, emergence of different species and their relations to each other are one and 
the same process. 
32
 For a more detailed treatment of this idea compare [Hanappi, 2006]. 
33
 For the human species forms of exploitation of nature are usually combined with forms of the exploitation of 
one class of society by another class of society, of man by man. Since even in biology borderlines between 
species are hard to determine genetically, exploitative social relations play a central role for the structure 
between and within species. But note that exploitation, and thus class, is a dynamic concept, subjected to 
evolution.  
to grasp the two most important processes going on in actual economic development: 
technical progress and institutional evolution. 
To understand the former it would have been necessary to treat capitalist production units 
as exploitation maximizing enterprises, and not just traders of the resources they own, 
forced to low prices by competitive markets. And with the same argument it would have 
become clear that the emergence of new institutions – of the bourgeois class as well as of 
the newly emerging labor class34 - was enforced by the contradictions between the different 
groups, the different classes35. The endogenous emergence of institutions stays out of reach 
for any theory that insists on the notions of the ‘representative household’ and the 
‘representative firm’. But both developments - technical advance as well as institutional 
evolution - actually were extremely strong and had profoundest feedback influence on the 
path of economic evolution. 
Inadequate theory is bound to be faltering – at least in the long-run. When the Great 
Depression proved the assumption of the effortless final arrival at the paradise of free 
market interaction to be definitely wrong, critics of the received doctrine – which itself 
necessarily remained mute – became a say36. Schumpeter attacked common wisdom of the 
economist profession by substituting the equilibrium of traders of resources by a diversity of 
active entrepreneurs eager to push markets out of equilibrium37. Keynes added the political 
institution of the nation state and an independent influence of money oriented behavioral 
traits, e.g. an independent investment function, to replace the scanty models of his teacher 
Alfred Marshall38.  Rudolf Hilferding, creatively extending some of Marx’ insights, went even 
further and tried to incorporate the latest development of capitalism – he insisted that on 
the way towards more oligopolistic market structures a new form of capital was emerging: 
finance capital39.  And the only Austrian Nobel prize laureate, Friedrich Hayek, critically and 
lucidly remarked: ‘What I complain of is not that this theory [the quantity theory of money] in 
its various forms has unduly usurped the central place in monetary theory, but that the point 
of view from which it springs is a positive hindrance to further progress. Not the least harmful 
effect of this particular theory is the present isolation of the theory of money from the main 
body of general economic theory.’ [Hayek, 1931, p.4]. 
These and other criticisms lead to a revival of ideas closer to classical political economy, and 
as a new departure within economic theory it came with a new brand name: 
macroeconomics. In hindsight it seems to be rather obvious that it never really developed 
into a common, generally accepted view synthesizing all essential aspects of 20th century 
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 The strongest growth of labor union membership occurred just in the three decades before World War 1.  
35
 Institutions therefore typically can either be a vehicle serving as a focal point for one of the involved groups, 
or they can be constituted for a (temporary) freeze of a compromise reached.  
36
 In this respect the current crisis shows the same characteristic. 
37
 See e.g. [Schumpeter, 1939]. 
38
 See [Keynes, 1936]. 
39
 Compare [Hilferding R., 1910]. 
capitalism40. Despite the amazing theoretical progress in many specialized areas no coherent 
set of theories able to describe the essential characteristics of the development of the world 
economy emerged. One reason might have been the extremely shaky course, which global 
political economy took in the 20th century41. An overarching theoretical construct would 
have needed much more effort with respect to the two formerly mentioned blind spots of 
mainstream economic theory: technological progress and institutional evolution. 
At least macroeconomics as part of economics was firmly established and culminated in a 
widely accepted formalization of Keynes’ central ideas provided by John Hicks: the IS-LM 
framework. There the idea of the importance of state intervention degenerated to shifts of 
both schedules (IS and LM) in an output-interest rate diagram due to government action 
(fiscal or monetary policy). The idea that money processes should be intrinsically included in 
any model of a monetary economy was reduced to two theoretical innovations. (1) A money 
demand function, which not only included the traditional transaction cash motive but also 
demand for ‘speculative purposes’; (2) an independent investment demand which compared 
an expected internal rate of return with a prevailing market interest rate. Both arguments 
refer to the process of using credit-money to achieve growth and thus comply with the stage 
of capital. 
An additional feature of Keynes’ model – perhaps its most important property42 - was that it 
revived an old idea going back to the school of Physiocrats in the 18th century43. In each year, 
within a closed geographical region, the total amount of money is bound to stay constant, 
but has to follow a certain circular flow mirroring the needs of different social classes in the 
course of this year. When in agricultural societies seed and harvest set the rhythm the year 
was a natural beat for the whole economy. Keynes, as long as he looked only at flows, could 
suggest a similar scheme: If new systematic build-up of inventories occurs, then total output 
during a year has to be identical with total demand (both in money terms), and since the 
different uses that this demand is channeled to can be neatly structured, there emerges an 
additional modeling constraint.  
It is remarkable how this simple amendment that linked aggregate supply and aggregate 
demand (both in monetary terms) together with Schumpeter’s suggestion of disequilibrium 
dynamics was able to stimulate a first wave of non-linear macrodynamics 44 . But 
                                                          
40
 Paul Samuelson’s vision (still a pupil of Schumpeter) of a ‚neoclassical synthesis‘remained a fragment in that 
respect – and later collapsed completely when the so-called ‘microfoundation of macroeconomics’ failed. 
41
 There are good reasons why the eminent historian Eric Hobsbawm has dubbed this century the “Age of 
Extremes”, see [Hobsbawm E., 1996]. 
42
 One of the most important side-effects was the establishment of statistical offices, which in most advanced 
countries started to collect data along the lines of Keynes’ circular flow variables. Economically relevant 
relationships were suddenly assumed to be found in the data collected rather than as innate properties of 
human brains.  
43
 The leading figure of this school producing the famous Tableau éonomique was Francois Quesnay [Quesnay, 
1758]. 
44
 As Paul Krugman later correctly noted Richard Goodwin, [Goodwin, 1955] – another pupil of Schumpeter -
was the champion of that movement, see [Krugman, 1996, p. 63]. Goodwin in his later work explicitly hinted at 
unfortunately Keynes attitude to state behavioral rules always with variables in real money 
terms, i.e. postulating that economic agents are always fully aware of inflation, prevented 
the early model-builders to take Schumpeter’s warning that a well-developed banking 
system is pivotal for innovation, serious. Macrodynamics of the 40-ties and 50-ties became a 
disappearing fashion. 
Nevertheless a more adequate picture of what essentially was happening in the long-run of 
capitalist development was in the air. Schumpeter, inspired by Nikolai Kondratiev 45 , 
proposed to single out innovations - and in the sequel their drivers, the economic agents he 
called entrepreneurs – as the central elements of capitalist progress. The mechanics 
proposed by Schumpeter and Keynes in principle was quite clear and not too far away from 
the actual working of the system. It could be sketched as follows:  
In repeated cycles households save part of the money they earn, transfer it to banks, which 
in turn provide credit-money for entrepreneurs. Competitive markets force entrepreneurs 
not only to invest, but also to increase labor productivity of existing production processes46 
and to introduce new products and services. The increased output emerging that way could 
either be added to the stocks of exploited profit in banks (hence the banks central role to 
search for promising entrepreneurs) or could be given to the ever more organized labor class 
to secure political stability as well as effective demand. Since these rather sophisticated 
dynamics surely look unstable, the capitalist state is necessarily intervening – either 
politically (Schumpeter’s view) or economically (Keynes’ view). This vision of the process 
flirts with Hegel’s “List der Vernunft” as well as with Mandeville’s “private vices to public 
virtues” 47 . As entrepreneurs strive for maximum profit the structural constraint of 
competition forces them to do something beneficial for the whole society, they drive 
innovation – and they usually are not aware of that fact. Above all this view seems to be 
close to what Karl Marx seemed to have envisaged as the historical mission of capitalism in 
his manifesto [Marx, 1848].  
Though not adequately formalized yet, the success of the system described in the Keynes-
Schumpeter perspective would clearly be supported by empirical observation. The social 
contract implicit in this working of 20th centuries advanced countries was extremely 
successful in increasing GDP per capita. Diagram 1 shows the data for twelve Western 
European countries48 first collected by Angus Maddison [Maddison, 2006]. This is the 
explosion of technical progress, which has to be explained by economic theory. Note that 
GDP is measured in real terms and that per capita is based on total population, not on 
employment. Labor productivity would be based on employment and thus would show the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
his intention to combine Marx’ ideas with Keynesian modeling, and insights of Schumpeter to contribute to 
what he called the MKS-tradition.  
45
 Compare [Kondratiev N., 1926] 
46
 A particularly interesting and recent empirical study of this link is [Ilyina and Samaniego, 2009].  
47
 See [Hegel, 1807] and [Mandeville, 1714]. 
48
 They originally were chosen due to data availability: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. 
more production process oriented development, whereas the line shown in diagram 1 
concerns the average welfare effect of technological advance. 
 
Diagram 1: Growth of GDP per Capita 
But Keynes reintroduction of the cyclical character of economic activity, despite its merits 
had crucial, even devastating short-comings. Instead of modeling accumulation and 
exploitation his concentration on circular flows falls back on the counterfactual assumption 
of equilibrium. Keynes’ bon mot that ‘in the long-run we are all dead’ hides the fact that his 
basic setup necessarily is restricted to short-run considerations – without any references to 
empirically observed analogies. As soon as medium-term developments appear interesting 
this setup collapses. The simplest case was taken care of by early growth models, e.g. the 
first one constructed by Keynes colleague Roy Harrod49. The simple extension mainly 
concerned a definition: Capital is defined as the stock of accumulated net investment.  
From the point of view of evolution of money forms argued so far this is a serious 
misconception. While the amount of money signs in a given area certainly can be measured 
at well specified points in time, and an increase of that amount over time might be 
computed, this still remains measurement of money in its first form and cannot explain the 
role of credit and capital as a program. Even 19th century classical political economy knew 
better when it coined the phrase ‘madame la terre et monsieur le capital’. Land clearly was 
seen to be the passive factor of production; possible output was usually thought to be a little 
bit less than proportional to its extension. This is a far cry of the confusion occurring later 
when land – now called ‘capital’ – was assumed to have decreasing marginal returns. On the 
                                                          
49
 Compare [Harrod R., 1939]. 
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Twelve Western European Countries 
other hand the active role of the classical ‘monsieur le capital’ vanished from the production 
function until Schumpeter let him in again as magically shifting functions due to his 
‘entrepreneurial spirits’. One of the most exciting tasks of evolutionary economics still 
remains to put more flesh on Schumpeter’s sometimes rather naïve view of this innovation 
process. Above all, little has been achieved to further our understanding of capital as a 
process of the most developed monetary form. How important that is can again be grasped 
by a glance at diagram 2 showing the long-run evolution of the Dow Jones index. 
 
Diagram 2: Dow Jones Index as a description of the success of capital 
Since this index provides an evaluation of the most important corporations in the world 
performing the capital program, it reflects how successful capital works. Noteworthy the 
great take-off here appears after 1982, and not immediately after World War 2 as in the 
previous diagram 1. This highlights the two phases of accelerated accumulation: one 
immediately after the war basically enhancing welfare, and a second phase from 1982 on, 
which left welfare on its old track but added substantial accumulation to the Dow Jones 
measure50. The economic interpretation of the two phases is straight forward: While 
Western Europe over the whole after-war-period till 2007 experienced a strong increase in 
economic power (power of population to produce GDP) and general welfare (GDP 
distributed to citizens) – everything on average – there is an additional upward push in the 
evaluation of the globally most relevant corporations since the beginning of the 80-ties. This 
second phase thus evidently coincides with the broad political roll-back to conservative 
economic policies in most OECD countries, Reagan in the USA, Thatcher in the UK, Kohl in 
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 The DJI (industrial average) is the most widely accepted measure of capital activity with the longest historical 
time series. 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
3
1
.0
1
.1
9
0
0
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
0
5
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
1
0
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
1
5
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
2
0
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
2
5
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
3
0
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
3
5
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
4
0
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
4
5
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
5
0
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
5
5
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
6
0
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
6
5
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
7
0
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
7
5
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
8
0
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
8
5
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
9
0
3
0
.0
1
.1
9
9
5
3
0
.0
1
.2
0
0
0
3
0
.0
1
.2
0
0
5
3
0
.0
1
.2
0
1
0
Dow Jones 
Germany, and others51. Seen from the international perspective this political switch, after a 
long-period of a catch-up race of Europe and Japan, heralded the somewhat surprising 
second wave of even stronger unchallenged US hegemony culminating in the break-down of 
the Soviet Union in the early 90-ties. 
Obviously the working of capital on a global scale became even more linked to political 
evolutions in this second phase than before. In the vision of most of mainstream economics 
even today the discipline of economics concerns specific mechanisms (mostly market 
mechanisms) working in a vacuum of direct coercive power. All such power is thought to be 
monopolized in an anonymously governing political entity securing economic rules - and the 
study of this entity falls out of economists’ concern since it is covered by political science. As 
argued above, this political entity never has been anonymous, but rather resides at the core 
of economics providing its indispensable monetary authority. This monetary authority 
mainly comes in two forms: A guarantee of the validity of the sign system representing 
social value, and the provision and adaption of the rules of the economic games played in 
the jurisdiction of this entity. In particular the second element neatly fits to the definition of 
capital put forward in this paper: It is the ensemble of the change of rules in nation states, 
the reframing of the program environment of the capital algorithms, which is responsible for 
the boom after 1982. 
In other words, the long-run enhancement in labor productivity became superimposed by 
institutional evolutions initiating a new spurt of capital increasingly centered on the USA. 
Institutional settings became incredibly important for capital52; in short, an old player in 
classical political economy reentered the center of the stage: the state. 
 
The State 
Nation states in their new, non-feudal form are the institutional correlate to the evolution 
from credit-money to capital. Though in most countries the feudal class officially remained in 
power till World War 1, the underground erosion of its influence started much earlier. When 
its rule finally broke the world slipped into the deep troubles of the 20th century53, which in 
retrospect can be understood as a search for new institutional solutions. The two remaining 
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 In a recent paper this second phase also is characterized as a worldwide inflow of capital to US capital 
markets, compare [Mendoza et al., 2009]. It is accompanied by a relative shift of the US portfolio (as compared 
to other countries) towards more risky capital algorithms. Probably the stronger military stance of US policy 
compensated and enabled this shift.  
52
 A good example is telecom firms for whom the national regulations of a country are the most important 
influence on profits. More generally, transnational corporations’ success critically hinges on using different 
national regulations for labor market regimes and tax regimes. 
53
 A second look at diagram 1 reveals that these troubles also materialized as welfare losses: World War 1, 
Great Depression, and World War 2. 
regimes, which – contrary to the fascist model - survived after WW2, were the new 
integrated capitalist state and the Stalinist production system54. 
The development of institutional settings, as already mentioned in the previous section, is 
the second blind spot of mainstream economics today. It has received even less attention 
than technical progress. Of course, there is a fast growing literature discussing and 
describing the diversity of contemporary capitalism55, and even the implications of cultural 
and institutional diversity on decisions of transnational corporations are extensively 
empirically studied56.  
Nevertheless the evolution of this diversity has not been conceptualized particularly 
convincing. There has been some effort to collect different perspectives from heterodox 
economics, see e.g. [Hodgsen G. et al., 2001], but a synthesizing approach still seems to be 
out of reach. 
It is not surprising that attempts to conceptual institutional evolution along the lines of 
Darwin’s ideas on biological evolution of the human species emerged early on, with Herbert 
Spencer readily introducing the analogy between biological selection and survival in 
competitive economic markets57. A thorough discussion of the issues surrounding ‘Social 
Darwinism’ and the role it played for fascism would go beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
nevertheless evident that after WW2 the misuse of Darwin’s concepts by fascist propaganda 
let social scientists shy away from direct applications of biological concepts to social 
developments. In retrospect, not much has been lost by the neglect of these early 
developments. The evolution of institutional settings was not in the focus of social 
Darwinism anyway, Spencer’s atomistic view (19th century market liberalism) had been 
substituted by archaic, hierarchical systems with little or no explanatory force. 
What actually happened in institutional structures since 1945 is above all a strong trend 
towards more continental political entities, the emergence of continental units. Though 
there is considerable change in the list of nation states too58, the social innovation of the last 
sixty years clearly has been ‘continental units in a common global context’.  The most 
remarkable institutional social innovations date back to early years of that era: the 
Worldbank, the IMF, WTO (former GATTS), and the UN. Note that one important 
international rule system did not survive the early 70-ties and thus is a good candidate for 
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 Compare [Hanappi, 1994, pp.103-162] for a more detailed description of the latter.  
55
 An interesting comparative study of five types of contemporary capitalism was presented by Bruno Amable 
[Amable, 2003]. For a survey of issues related to that variety see [Elsner W. & Hanappi H., 2008]. 
56
 Some of the most promising contributions come from a group of Dutch economists, which originally tried to 
nail down the theoretical framework of New Economic Geography to answer empirical questions of spatial 
economic policy, see [Brakman et al., 2007, pp. 267-405]. Another good example of empirically interesting 
conclusions with respect to firm evolution is [Lechevalier, 2007]. 
57
 See [Spencer H., 1862], a contemporary and rival of Darwin, who combines his evolutionism with the strict 
market liberalism (against any state intervention, [Spencer H., 1884]) so typical for aristocratic scientists of the 
19
th
 century.   
58
 Compare [Radax W. et al., 2009]. 
the explanation of the following discontinuity in 1982: The Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates59. 
After the turbulent institutional attempts in the war and peace periods of the first half of the 
20th century the second half saw the fading away of the Stalinist production system of the 
Soviet Union till the 90-ties, and more recently the flourishing of a modified variant of this 
system in China. These basic breaks in global political economy set the frame for the 
institutional variants accommodating capital in the Western world since 1992. In particular 
the evolution of financial institutions since that point in time can reveal interesting insights. 
From an evolutionary perspective such an investigation should beware of a two simplistic 
analogy, a mistake to be found in the concluding chapter of the economic historian Niall 
Ferguson’s recent book [Ferguson N., 2008, pp. 341-358]: 
“Financial history is essentially the result of institutional mutation and natural selection. 
Random ‘drift’ (innovations/mutations that are not promoted by natural selection, but just 
happen) and ‘flow’ (innovations/mutations that are caused when, say, American practices 
are adopted by Chinese banks) play a part. There can also be ‘co-evolution’, when different 
financial species work and adapt together (like hedge funds and their prime brokers). But 
market selection is the main driver. Financial organisms are in competition with one another 
for finite resources. At certain times and in certain places, certain species may become 
dominant. But innovations by competitor species, or the emergence of altogether new 
species, prevent any permanent hierarchy or monoculture from emerging. Broadly speaking, 
the law of the survival of the fittest applies. Institutions with a ‘selfish gene’ that is good at 
self-replication and self-perpetuation will tend to proliferate and endure.” [Ferguson N., 
2008, pp. 350-351] 
Though it might be a kind of excuse that the text was written in May 2008, when the full 
extent of the looming crisis of finance institutions what not yet visible, it nevertheless is a 
timeless example of undue transplantation of biological metaphors. Financial institutions are 
not born by simple ‘innovation/mutation’; they are strongly linked to the regulatory rule 
system of the nation states and thus are shaped in a way that reflects the surrounding 
political entity. The death of these finance institutions usually is not caused by competitive 
rivals on markets for ‘scarce resources’. It rather needs a complex procedure – including 
several political entities sometimes from state agencies to unions - to allow a large financial 
intermediary to go bankrupt. Finally, Richard Dawkins’ suggestion60 to re-introduce a moral 
concept, selfishness (remember Mandeville’s ‘vices’), does not lead to a better 
understanding of the performance of financial institutions – to say the least. 
                                                          
59
 It is tempting to interpret the second phase, which is so dominant in diagram 2, as being based on 
‘exploitation via flexible exchange rates in a globalizing world of TNCs’. The success of capital on a global scale 
in this second phase contrasted by only continuous growth in diagram 1 (average GDP per capita) translates 
into an opening spread of incomes: Those derived from these global successes explode while those (in Western 
Europe) which were not had to grow slower than before 1982 to arrive at the continuity shown in diagram 1. 
60
 Compare [Dawkins R., 1989], and see [Lewontin et al., 1984] for a critique of Dawkins‘ attempt to extend 
biological metaphors to the social sciences. 
As argued in this paper, instead of unwise direct use of concepts of evolutionary biology, the 
evolution from money to capital is a process, which evolutionary economics has to explain as 
an indispensable part of the economic evolution in general, of monetary political economy. 
The two important trajectories shaping the last two hundred years of capital were 
technological progress and institutional evolution, in the light of their development steps 
financial institutions have to be understood. The evolution of the state, again, is a rather big 
topic; only a selected range of issues can be mentioned here. 
The ‘state’ today comes mainly in three formats61: As nation state, as continental unit, and 
as a globally governing political unit. In the USA and in most parts of the EU the elementary 
money form (US Dollar, Euro) is provided at the continental level, in Asia such a unit is still in 
the making. The most developed form, the capital algorithm, in principle works on the global 
level though the level of regulations for most rules is the national level. Financial institutions 
carrying and executing the regulations are to be found on all three levels, and there is a 
trend to move power to the upper levels, leaving smaller tasks to subsidiary lower levels. 
With respect to the existence of respective political bodies their evolution on all three levels, 
and in particular towards the highest level has just entered a hot phase since 1982. The 
emergence of the EU is a very recent development, a similar entity uniting China, Japan, and 
India has not even started – not to speak of the global level. In each of these institutional 
evolutions specific history and culture of the concerned area – formally spoken: foregone 
path dependency – play a crucial role. As a consequence evolutionary economics has to 
revive its history component to better understand current options and possible future 
trajectories of institutional evolution. In a sense the currently starting general crisis is just a 
symptom of the mismatch of the available institutional carrier systems and the capital 
program of large scale private carriers. Given this interpretation the depth of the crisis is not 
surprising – hopefully it gives birth to a new global institutional design. Many current 
proposals of singular adjustments of some rules of the prevailing financial architecture (e.g. 
Basel 3) miss this point and will prove as useless as will be the desperate conjurations of 
ethical behavior of capital managers. This crisis is not about the misbehavior of individual 
physical persons. 
What has to fit a new global institutional setting is a worldwide structure of production 
units, a structure, which builds on (and partly transforms) the existing structure62. The 
separation of functions between globally acting TNCs and local SMEs, the main providers of 
employment, is already taking place63. The original role of the banking system in the 20th 
century - namely to discover the most profitable routes for further capital expansion and to 
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 The focus on these three formats is due to the emphasis on the state’s role as a monetary authority. A 
broader approach centering on the many ideological tasks the state takes care of, can be found in [Althusser L., 
1970].  
62
 The contemporary interaction between TNCs and nation states concentrates on choice of capital structure of 
the former given ‘political risks’ set by the latter, as empirically studied by e.g. [Kesternich and Schnitzer, 2009]. 
63
 In a recent contribution this development of global firm structure and its connection to global mega-cities is 
discussed in more detail [Hanappi, 2009]. 
channel credit towards these investments – has stagnated in the last two decades. Profitable 
intrusion of new spaces for investment became difficult. Indeed the financial hype after the 
IT bubble in 2001 was built with the help of self-fulfilling prophecies, which needed not to be 
grounded on actually existing expectations concerning profitable real investment64 – simply 
because such possibilities became extremely rare. It is thus a logical consequence that the 
mismatch between the most advanced money form (the capital program) and its welfare 
enhancing ‘historical mission’ first made its appearance as the fall of a carrier system of that 
mission, the fall of a large financial institution,  the fall of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 
2008. 
Immediately after this pivotal turn the role of state intervention - on all three levels and in 
content contrary to almost all policy discussion since 1982 - was suddenly on the agenda 
again65. Since then the debate more and more concentrated on the question of where and 
how the state should intervene, and if it should intervene at all was discussed less and less. 
But if the necessity for the states active role is taken for granted, then the next questions are 
for the type of intervention and for quality and democratic control of the state’ s decision 
makers (again at all three levels). But these questions are nothing else than the above 
mentioned call for the design of a desirable institutional setting. 
 
Some Policy Conclusions 
Any policy conclusion – in particular in critical situations – rests on a vision of possible future 
developments, in a less mundane language: on forecasts. Forecasts in times of deep crisis 
need a far reaching interpretation of the past (e.g. the one given in the previous sections of 
this paper) as well as some empirical evaluation of what was just happening in the 
immediate past. There exists an impressive flood of descriptions concerning the latter66  
diagram 3 just shows the recent development of the Dow Jones Index.    
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 A more theoretical companion paper to this paper discusses four reasons for the financial crisis in more 
detail [Hanappi H. and Rengs B., 2008].    
65
 As a recent contribution compare [Auerback, 2009]. 
66
 One of the most informative papers is [Calomiris, 2008], a survey of events is [Furceri and Mourougane, 
2009]. 
 Diagram 3: Dow Jones Index (daily) as a description of recent events 
To make sure that this rather dramatic short-run development at the world’s stock 
exchanges is not just the usual working of these markets necessary to clean it from unsound 
expectations, take a look at the long-run, real GDP growth rates of the USA, Germany, 
Austria and the four next largest countries of the Eurozone (France, Italy, Spain, UK) in 
diagram 4.  
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 Diagram 4: Growth rates of real GDP 
As the diagram shows, there can be no doubt that this is the worst crisis for output and 
employment in the world since the Great Depression. According to our (continuously 
improved but always preliminary) forecasts the worst is still to come: The fall in employment 
has hit all countries and there is no prospect for recovery67. How far average household 
incomes did fall due to this employment crunch did depend heavily on the incomes policy of 
the respective nation state. By subsidizing wages and supporting private and semi-private 
financial intermediaries (e.g. banks and insurance companies) many countries translated the 
global crisis into a national public debt crisis. Given that measures for some time most 
European households were able to keep consumption at only slowly decreasing levels - using 
up their savings and credit worthiness. But then, starting with the case of Greece, 
international short-run speculation discovered the use of large scale profit rate expectations 
derived from producing information about possible public debt default of a country. In the 
last years this new game of international finance did gain momentum, spreading to all 
Mediterranean countries and Ireland, and called into question the very existence of the 
European Union. Indeed the EU seems to be at the crossroads: Either it falls prey to the 
global capital program, which aims at restoring profitability in the weakest parts of the 
European country chain by re-introducing exploitation standards which European citizens 
today only know from TV-programs about less developed parts of the world. Or Europe 
unites and constitutes itself in a much more stringent and consistent way as currently is the 
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 See [Wray, 2009] for an appraisal of the importance of avoiding high mass unemployment. Martin Shubik, in 
a similar vein, suggests social innovation in the form of a ‘Federal Employment Reserve Authority’, compare 
[Shubik, 2009]. 
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case. To avoid European disintegration a close look at the reasons for disintegrative forces, 
an analysis of the emerging contradictions, will be the first necessary step. And this 
immediately leads to the incompatibility of the globally working finance capital program and 
full employment in Europe68. To some extent the notion of full employment might be 
redefined by reforming labor time organization. But still many questions will remain: How 
can European public political institutions be implemented, which can secure the existing 
welfare standard at a zero growth rate? What can be the position of European economic 
activity in the global division of labor? If political institutions are not forced to grow - and to 
pay interest - the new monetary regime in Europe must still be made compatible to the 
global financial architecture. Add the even more burning question that the chain reactions of 
the global crisis are finding other weak chains in the highly interdependent global political 
economy with accelerating speed, the upheaval in the Arab countries is just the latest 
outstanding example.  
In that situation social and political pressure on policy makers already is enormous. This 
might enhance the efforts to develop and to implement a new institutional setting on a 
global level. But it also is an extremely dangerous transition period – comparable in some 
respect to the thirties of the last century – since the history-dependent national responses 
to such a crisis easily can lead to locally dangerous phenomena, to governments based on 
direct coercive power instead of democracy69. The availability of highly efficient military 
means makes such a threat indeed more threatening than ever. 
But even if it is possible to avoid the worst70, there will be no return to a smooth working of 
the old capital algorithm with high profit rates. Indeed the two big bubbles (ITC and finance) 
at the beginning of the century showed that the recent surge of five boom years has been 
built on thin air already. Of course, the omnipresent capital program will not vanish – but it 
will lose its dominant role, and in most advanced OECD countries will have to be content 
with very low accumulation rates. No contemporary TNC can be imagined that can keep its 
organizational structure and culture with such a low profit rate. So the global setup of firms, 
of production units, will have to change profoundly. The lower turning point leading to this 
mild recovery might be reached in 2015, so reorganization should start within the mid-term 
planning horizon of large firms. But there will be some firms winning, at least in terms of 
market shares of the shrinking market, and they will be hard to convince to accept new 
global political rules. 
In several other aspects a return to direct political measures can be expected too. To secure 
a sustainable level of employment labor time regimes will be adjusted rather quickly – short 
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 Some more sanguine politicians still express their pointless hope for an automatic reconciliation of this 
contradiction as their ‘hope for growth’. 
69
 Therefore a sophisticated regulatory response of institutions on the national level, tailored to the respective 
situation, is particularly important. This, of course, includes financial institutions; see [Nier, 2009]. 
70
 Olivier Blanchard suggests a set of Keynes-style, demand-oriented measures to fight the crisis; Barry 
Eichengreen concentrates on regulatory remedies engineered by a reformed IMF, see [Blanchard, 2008] and 
[Eichengreen, 2009]. An alternative (even more ‘Keynesian’) interpretation and proposal for a policy recipe is 
provided by Jan Kregel [Kregel, 2009]. 
time work will be here to stay and solutions tailored to the needs of production units and 
households hopefully will be found. Direct employment as state employees will start to play 
the important role of an immediate remedy. Since all this increases government 
expenditure, the question of who is lending to the government has already become virulent. 
If the crisis is global the traditional banking sector will not be able to step in and a partial 
return to measures reminding on command economies – perhaps including a moratorium on 
public debts in the USA and Europe - will be inevitable. As in wartimes, a war against 
unemployment lead and ‘financed’ by governments might be a preferable solution.  
With respect to money this highly speculative outlook strongly points to a new 
metamorphosis of the money form. As was the case with previous form changes, the new 
form will not simply replace the current one; it rather will superimpose new and dominant 
features71. And these features will have to be able to solve the most pressing problems of 
the global human species in the new century. The global character of these bottlenecks 
clearly calls for a large scale political decision procedure - democracy at work – carried out 
and executed by highly professional and committed agencies.  
Global economic policy will have to work along the lines of the respective next bottleneck. 
The major three problem areas to be solved next - the new ‘historical mission’ of the new 
money forms following the capital algorithm - could be: 
(1) Solving the question of avoiding a fallback to regimes of direct coercive power  
(2) Solving the questions of sustainable environmental conditions 
(3) Solving the questions of increasing income and wealth inequality in the world      
Channeling economic and political activity towards work solving these problems will again be 
a program rather than a simple sign system of social values. It will even be a more 
complicated program than the capital algorithm residing in business plans and psychological 
traits of humans today. As a top-down program it will need not only conscious planning but 
even planning of consciousness of the society as a whole. It thus will be a new experience for 
mankind. Money, the materialized expression of social value, on its long journey to ever 
greater abstraction, will start to become intention on a global, social scale. Technical 
progress has already produced the preconditions72; institutional evolution – indeed the 
implementation of adequate mechanisms of democracy – is knocking at the door of 
scientists, of evolutionary economists, to complete a synthesizing vision for this century73. 
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 This, of course, is also true for technical innovation proper, for new products and processes. Technical 
innovation will go on, but the newly dominating form of reproductive innovation – out of need - will be more 
and more social innovation. Technological innovation will turn towards change of products and processes, 
capital growth as a motive for innovation will fade out. The entrepreneur as social entity will be transformed 
along these lines. 
72
 In a large research project for the Austrian National Bank the technological impact on money forms has been 
studied [Hanappi, 1999].  
73
 It is encouraging that the Nobel prize in 2009 was given to Elenor Ostrom, whose major contributions – 
contrary to many journalists’ perceptions – concern the ‘understanding of institutional diversity’ [Ostrom, 
2005]. 
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